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Abstract
This paper analyzes the conduct of the optimal monetary policy with imperfect
information on the shocks hitting the economy where ﬁrms’ prices are strategic com-
plements. Monetary policy entails a dual stabilizing role, as a policy response that
inﬂuences directly the economy and as a vehicle for information that shapes ﬁrms’
beliefs. In the case where more information is welfare detrimental, the central bank
faces a dilemma, for its monetary instrument aimed at stabilizing the economy may
harmfully shape ﬁrms’ beliefs. Recognizing the signaling role of its instrument, the
central bank ﬁnds it optimal to distort its policy response in order to mitigate the
detrimental information that it may convey.
JEL classiﬁcation: E52, E58, D82.
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In the ongoing debate on the social value of public information, most of the literature
considers information as being disclosed by means of an explicit and oﬃcial statement made
by an institution like a central bank.1 The contribution of this paper is to argue that taking
a policy action also conveys information as an implicit communication. For instance, the
implementation of monetary policy reveals to the market the economic assessment of the
central bank. When it is perfectly observed, the policy action implemented by a policy
maker discloses public information even in the absence of an explicit statement. So, the
response of a policy maker entails a dual role, as an action that inﬂuences directly economic
outcomes and as a vehicle for information that inﬂuences the beliefs of market participants.
The main contribution of this paper is to highlight the signaling role of policy choices and
to show how the design of the optimal policy should take into account the value of the
information conveyed by the policy action. Although there is a growing literature on the
desirability of central bank transparency, it has largely abstracted from the interaction
between the choice to be transparent and the optimal design of monetary policy.2
To illustrate the signaling role of the policy action, we consider the optimal conduct
of monetary policy in an economy where monetary frictions are caused by imperfect in-
formation. In this environment, communication turns out to be an essential component
in designing the optimal monetary policy pattern because it drives the degree of infor-
mation imperfection and the real eﬀects of policy choices. In particular, we distinguish
two channels by which the central bank discloses information to the private sector. First,
the central bank explicitly discloses information by making an announcement; this is the
form of communication with which the literature usually deals. Second, the central bank
implicitly discloses information about its assessment on the economy by implementing its
monetary policy. The signaling role of monetary policy has been well documented by
Romer and Romer (2000). Using US data, they show that “the Federal Reserve’s actions
1See Geraats (2002) for an overview and the literature in the vein of Morris and Shin (2002) seminal
beauty-contest paper, for instance Hellwig (2005) and Lorenzoni (2010).
2Some exceptions are Angeletos et al. (2006), Hellwig et al. (2006), or Walsh (2007) who analyze the
signaling role of policy choices on market participants in diﬀerent contexts.
1signal its information” and that “commercial forecasters raise their expectations of inﬂa-
tion in response to contractionary Federal Reserve actions [...]” (Romer and Romer (2000,
p. 430)). Considering the signaling role of the instrument set by the central bank points
out the intertwined relation between the implementation of a policy instrument and the
communication strategy of the central bank. On the one hand, the optimal monetary
policy is a function of ﬁrms’ beliefs and thereby of the communication strategy of the
central bank. On the other hand, since monetary policy conveys information to ﬁrms, it
is a constitutive part of the communication strategy of the central bank. As a result, the
central bank should choose its instrument by optimally balancing both its direct impact
on the economy and the information it conveys to market participants. In particular, if
the central bank wishes to withhold information from the markets, it should adjust the
conduct of monetary policy in order not to release too much information through its policy
action.
The economy that we consider is hit by two types of disturbances, namely a stochastic
labor supply shock that induces parallel variations in both the eﬃcient and the equilibrium
level of output and a stochastic mark-up shock that induces variations in the equilibrium
level of output but leaves the eﬃcient level unaﬀected. Providing better information
reduces frictions and helps economic agents reach the equilibrium level of output that
would prevail in a frictionless economy. As Angeletos and Pavan (2007) emphasizes,
providing more information is welfare improving to the extent that the equilibrium and the
eﬃcient level of output are symmetrically aﬀected by shocks. So, withholding information
about the mark-up shock is welfare improving because it prevents the economy from
moving too closely to the frictionless equilibrium level of output and thereby from deviating
too much from the eﬃcient level.3 This creates a case for constructive ambiguity that can
be exploited by the central bank when taking its policy decision.
In the case where ﬁrms perfectly observe the monetary instrument but where the
3With a Lucas-type Phillips curve, Cukierman (2001) shows that transparency with respect to mark-up
shocks is detrimental to welfare because it impedes employment stabilization by the central bank. Under
opacity the central bank is able to optimally trade between employment and inﬂation stabilization through
inﬂation surprise. This mechanism is diﬀerent from ours in so far as in our model transparency exacerbates
ﬁrms’ reaction to mark-up shocks.
2central bank does not disclose any explicit announcement about its economic assessment,
ﬁrms cannot properly decipher the rationale behind the instrument. For instance, the
central bank may implement an expansionary instrument in response either to a positive
labor supply or a negative mark-up shock. The central bank can exploit this ambiguity by
distorting its response to labor supply and mark-up shocks in order to optimally balance
the direct stabilizing role of its instrument and its indirect stabilizing role through shaping
ﬁrms’ beliefs.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the economy. Section 3 derives
the optimal monetary policy for benchmark cases with homogeneous information. This
highlights the welfare eﬀect of information with respect to labor supply and to mark-up
shocks. Section 4 presents the optimal monetary policy under heterogeneous informa-
tion as a function of the communication strategy of the central bank. Finally, section 5
concludes.
2 The economy
The economy is derived from a small scale general equilibrium model with ﬂexible prices,
populated by a representative household, a continuum of monopolistic competitive ﬁrms,
and a central bank. Two types of stochastic shocks hit the economy, a labor supply shock
and a mark-up shock. The nominal aggregate demand is determined by the central bank
that maximizes the utility of the representative household. Apart from the informational
structure, we base our analysis on the model developed by Adam (2007).4
2.1 Representative household
The representative household chooses its aggregate composite good Y and labor supply L
in order to maximize its utility subject to its budget constraint,
U(Y ) − νV (L),
4For convenience, we only present here the main components of the economy and refer to Adam (2007)
for the detailed derivation of the model.
3s.t. WL + Π = PY + T.
W denotes the competitive wage, Π the proﬁts the household gets from ﬁrms, and T the
nominal transfer from the central bank. The parameter ν is a stochastic labor supply
shock with E(ν) = 1, that induces variations in the eﬃcient level of output. Y is the










where θ > 1 is the parameter of price elasticity of demand and where Yi is the good
produced by ﬁrm i. θ is stochastic with E(θ) = ¯ θ and induces variations in the desired
mark-up of ﬁrms and thereby in the equilibrium level of prices and of the output. P is




Each ﬁrm i produces a single diﬀerentiated good Yi with one unit of labor Li according
to the simple production function
Li = Yi.
The proﬁt maximization problem of ﬁrm i is given by
max
Pi
E[(1 + τ)PiYi(Pi) − WYi(Pi)|Γi],
where τ is an output subsidy that oﬀsets the eﬃciency detrimental eﬀect of the mark-up
and Γi is the information set of ﬁrm i. Linearizing the ﬁrst order condition of ﬁrm i’s
problem around its steady state delivers
pi = Ei[p + ξ(y − y∗) + u], (1)
where Ei is the expectation operator conditional on ﬁrm i’s information Γi and where
small letters indicate percentage deviation from the steady state. The pricing rule (1)
4states that ﬁrms set their price as a function of their expectations of the overall price level
p, the real output gap y − y∗, and the mark-up shock u. The deviation of the eﬃcient
level of output y∗ from its steady state is determined by the stochastic labor supply shifter
ν. The parameter ξ = −
U00(¯ Y )¯ Y
U0(¯ Y ) +
V 00(¯ Y )¯ Y
V 0(¯ Y ) determines the sensitivity of the optimal price
to the output gap and is increasing in the risk aversion of the household. The optimal




where ¯ θ is the price elasticity of demand at its steady state level. Firms ﬁnd it optimal
to increase their price when the price elasticity of demand θ falls below its steady state
value ¯ θ.
Using the fact that the nominal aggregate demand q can be expressed as q = y + p,
we rewrite the pricing rule (1) as
pi = Ei[(1 − ξ)p + ξq − ξy∗ + u]. (2)
ξ determines whether prices are strategic complements or substitutes. We realistically
assume that prices are strategic complements, i.e. 0 < ξ ≤ 1. This means that each ﬁrm
tends to rise its own price when it expects other ﬁrms to do so.
The labor supply shock and the mark-up shock are assumed to be normally and inde-






The central bank seeks to maximize the expected utility of the representative household
by adjusting its monetary instrument, the nominal demand q, conditional on its own
information. Appendix A derives the approximation of the welfare of the representative
household according to the informational structure of our economy. The monetary policy














subject to the pricing equation of ﬁrms (2). Coeﬃcients α and γ3 depend upon the
informational structure and the equilibrium condition of the economy as deﬁned below.
σ2
ρ captures the dispersion of ﬁrms’ private information.
2.4 Informational structure
Monetary frictions arise in our economy because of information imperfections. The recent
revival of interest in Phelps (1970) insight – according to which information imperfections
play a crucial role in the monetary transmission mechanism – includes the work of Adam
(2007), Hellwig (2002), Mankiw and Reis (2002), and Woodford (2003). These authors
emphasize the realistic dynamics of models relying on information imperfections when
ﬁrms’ prices are strategic complements.
2.4.1 Information of the central bank
The central bank receives in private a signal on each the labor supply and the mark-up
shock. Each signal deviates from the true value of the shock by an error term that is
normally distributed:
y∗
cb = y∗ + η, with η ∼ N(0,σ2
η)
ucb = u + µ, with µ ∼ N(0,σ2
µ),
where η and µ are independently distributed.
Since both fundamental shocks and error terms are independently normally distributed,
the optimal instrument rule of the central bank that determines the nominal aggregate
6demand q is a linear combination of its signals and can be written as
q = ζ1(y∗ + η) + ζ2(u + µ).
ζ1 and ζ2 describe how the central bank sets the nominal aggregate demand in response
to its signal on both shocks.
The central bank may disclose information to ﬁrms through two diﬀerent channels.
While the monetary instrument conveys information about its economic assessment when-
ever it is observed, the central bank may also make an explicit announcement that renders
the interpretation of the instrument unequivocal.
2.4.2 Information of ﬁrms
We introduce two sources of information imperfections with respect to ﬁrms.
On the one hand, following Mankiw and Reis (2002), we assume that information
spreads slowly through the economy. According to this information stickiness assumption,
only a fraction α of ﬁrms is informed about the contemporaneous economic development
while the remaining fraction 1 − α of ﬁrms does not receive any contemporaneous infor-
mation update at all. As emphasized in section 3, this ﬁrst source of frictions enable us to
solve the problem of price level indeterminacy and to derive the optimal monetary policy.
On the other hand, the information received by the fraction α of informed ﬁrms is noisy
and heterogeneous, what entails fundamental and strategic uncertainty. The information
received by the informed α-type ﬁrms is threefold.
First, each informed α-type ﬁrm i receives a private signal on the mark-up shock ui
that may be interpreted as a private estimate. The private signal of each ﬁrm deviates
from the true mark-up shock by an error term that is normally distributed:
ui = u + ρi, with ρi ∼ N(0,σ2
ρ),
where ρi are identically and independently distributed across α-type ﬁrms.
7Second, the α-type ﬁrms eventually observe the monetary instrument implemented
by the central bank. The signal released by the central bank on its instrument can be
generally expressed as
qi = q + ϕi, with ϕi ∼ N(0,σ2
ϕ).
Whenever the central bank is transparent with respect to its monetary instrument (σ2
ϕ =
0), the nominal level of aggregate demand q is common knowledge among the informed α-
type ﬁrms. By contrast, whenever the central bank is opaque with that respect (σ2
ϕ → ∞),
ﬁrms cannot observe the instrument. By making its instrument public, the central bank
gives an indication to ﬁrms about its own beliefs on the state of the economy. However,
ﬁrms are unable to properly understand the central bank’s assessment of the economy:
since the central bank responds to two shocks, the monetary instrument does not allow
ﬁrms to decipher the rationale behind the implemented policy, unless the central bank
discloses more information.
Third, whenever the central bank is transparent with respect to its monetary instru-
ment, the α-type ﬁrms eventually observe an additional public signal that completely
eliminates the informational asymmetry between the central bank and the α-type ﬁrms.
We assume that a fully transparent central bank directly discloses its signal on the eﬃcient
level of output y∗
cb, so that the α-type ﬁrms are able to properly interpret the rationale
for the monetary instrument.5 The signal released by the central bank on its economic
assessment can be generally expressed as
y∗
cb,i = y∗
cb + φi, with φi ∼ N(0,σ2
φ).
The case of transparency with respect to its economic assessment is captured by σ2
φ = 0
and the case of opacity by σ2
φ → ∞.
5One may think of diﬀerent types of announcement that would reveal central bank’s signals to ﬁrms. In
practice, the publication of inﬂation forecast and/or target appears to be the main form of announcement
adopted by transparent central banks.
82.5 Timing of events
The sequence of events is as follows. First, the communication strategy of the central bank
is determined and is common knowledge among ﬁrms.6 Second, the nature draws the labor
supply shock y∗ and the mark-up shock u. The central bank observes both shocks with an
error term and sets its monetary instrument q. According to its communication strategy, it
may reveal its instrument to the public and may make an explicit announcement y∗
cb. Based
on their private signal on the mark-up shock ui and – when available – on the monetary
instrument qi and on the announcement of the central bank y∗
cb,i, ﬁrms then simultaneously
determine their price. Finally, the household demands products for consumption and
production takes place. The central bank plays the role of a Stackelberg leader and will
exploit its ﬁrst mover advantage to shape ﬁrms’expectations.
3 Homogeneous information
In this section, benchmark information settings are discussed to illustrate the mechanism
of the model. First, it is shown that in a frictionless economy where both the central
bank and ﬁrms have perfect information, the optimal monetary policy is indeterminate.
Second, information stickiness is introduced for resolving the indeterminacy problem and
for illustrating the welfare eﬀect of information about mark-up shocks.
3.1 Perfect information
The case of perfect information is captured in our economy when there is no information
stickiness (α = 1) and when the error terms are zero: σ2
η = 0, σ2
µ = 0, and σ2
ρ = 0. With
perfect information there is no price dispersion across ﬁrms because all ﬁrms set the same
6In our setup the choice for the communication strategy occurs before the central bank observes its
signals on the shocks. We abstract here from the discussion on whether it is optimal for the central bank
to rely on its signals to choose its communication strategy and how ﬁrms’ would accordingly adjust their
beliefs.











q = y + p. (6)
Plugging (6) into (5) shows that an output gap (and a loss) appears whenever there is a
mark-up shock:




Because the price level p does not enter into the loss function (4), the optimal monetary
policy is indeterminate:




The nominal aggregate demand q can be chosen arbitrarily by the central bank and the
price level p will accept the corresponding value. In an frictionless economy, monetary





and is independent from the policy implemented by the central bank.
3.2 Perfect sticky-information
In order to solve the indeterminacy problem of monetary policy in the frictionless economy,
we introduce sticky information as described in section 2.4.2. In this setup, only a fraction
0 < α < 1 of ﬁrms is assumed to get an information update, the other 1−α ﬁrms remaining
completely uninformed. Yet, the error terms of the central bank and of the α-type ﬁrms
remain zero: σ2
η = 0, σ2
µ = 0, and σ2
ρ = 0. With perfect sticky-information the monetary














1 − α + αξ
(ξq − ξy∗ + u)
q = y + p.
Solving the problem (8) delivers the optimal monetary policy
q = y∗ −
α(¯ θ − 1)
1 − α + α¯ θξ
u
and yields a price level and an output gap given by
p =
α
1 − α + α¯ θξ
u and y − y∗ =
1 − α
1 − α + αξ
(q − y∗) −
α
1 − α + αξ
u =
−α¯ θ
1 − α + α¯ θξ
u
what implies an unconditional expected loss equal to
E(L) =
α¯ θ
ξ(1 − α + α¯ θξ)
σ2
u.
The optimal monetary policy indicates that labor supply shocks are perfectly accom-
modated what simultaneously closes the output gap and eliminates price deviations. By
contrast, mark-up shocks cannot be neutralized by the central bank.
Increasing the share α of informed ﬁrms strengthens the aggregated reaction to mark-
up shocks. As a result, when the share of informed α-type ﬁrms increases, the response
of the central bank to mark-up shocks becomes stronger (
∂q
∂α < 0), the price level and
the output gap deviations increase what entails a larger unconditional expected loss. So,
improving information among ﬁrms is welfare detrimental. While information about mark-
up shocks is privately desirable according to the optimal pricing rule of ﬁrms (2), it is
socially undesirable because of the eﬃciency wedges it creates.7
7At the limit, when α converges to 1, the output gap and the unconditional expected loss are identical
as under perfect information. However, the price level and the monetary policy are determinate at the
limit.
11The loss associated with mark-up distortions increases with the price elasticity of
demand ¯ θ. So, the central bank responds more aggressively to mark-up shocks when the
price elasticity of demand increases (
∂q
∂¯ θ < 0) and perfectly stabilizes the price level for
inﬁnite price elasticity.
4 Heterogeneous information
We now consider the more realistic case where ﬁrms have heterogeneous information. First,
we describe the general equilibrium of the economy and then derive the optimal monetary
policy according to three communication strategies of the central bank.
4.1 Equilibrium
This section solves the perfect Bayesian equilibrium and derives the optimal behavior of
ﬁrms according to their information set on the monetary instrument and on the central
bank assessment of the economy. The information set of α-type ﬁrms is composed of a
private signal on the mark-up shock ui, a signal on the nominal aggregate demand qi, and
a signal on the central bank assessment of the labor supply shock y∗
cb,i.8
For setting its optimal price according to (2), each α-type ﬁrm solves the inference
problem E[q,y∗,y∗
cb,u|qi,y∗



































































with Ω = VuoV−1
oo, where Vuo is the covariance matrix of the expected variables and the
signals and Voo is the covariance matrix of the signals themselves.
Following Morris and Shin (2002), we assume that α-type ﬁrms set their price according
8Note that the signals on the nominal aggregate demand qi and on the central bank assessment of the
labor supply shock y
∗
cb,i may be completely uninformative in the case of opacity.
12to the following linear pricing rule:
pi = γ1qi + γ2y∗
cb,i + γ3ui.
As derived in Appendix B, the equilibrium response of α-type ﬁrms to their signals is
given by the system of simultaneous equations:
γ1 =
α(1 − ξ)(γ2Ω31 + γ3Ω41) + ξ(Ω11 − Ω21) + Ω41
1 − α(1 − ξ)Ω11
(10)
γ2 =
α(1 − ξ)(γ1Ω12 + γ3Ω42) + ξ(Ω12 − Ω22) + Ω42
1 − α(1 − ξ)Ω32
γ3 =
α(1 − ξ)(γ1Ω13 + γ2Ω33) + ξ(Ω13 − Ω23) + Ω43
1 − α(1 − ξ)Ω43
.
The central bank chooses its monetary instrument to minimize the expected loss (3) subject
to (10) given the precision of its information.
We derive in the next sections the optimal monetary policy for three central bank
communication strategies. First, we consider the case of transparency where there is no
information asymmetry between the central bank and informed α-type ﬁrms. Second, we
derive the optimal monetary policy for the case of opacity where the central bank does not
disclose any information with respect to both its monetary instrument and its economic
assessment. And third, the case of intermediate transparency depicts the more interesting
situation where the central bank is transparent with respect to its monetary instrument
but does not disclose any additional information about its economic assessment.
While the current section presents the equilibrium for any degree of information sticki-
ness α, we concentrate in the remainder of the paper upon the limit case where the share of
informed ﬁrms α goes to one. This allows us to solve the indeterminacy problem that oc-
curs in the absence of stickiness while focusing on the heterogeneous nature of information
as frictions.9
9The sole presence of heterogeneous information leaves monetary policy indeterminate because the
implied price dispersion does not depend upon the price level.
134.2 Optimal monetary policy under transparency
Under transparency, the informed α-type ﬁrms perfectly observe the monetary instrument
q and the central bank assessment of the labor supply shock y∗
cb. Since there are two shocks
aﬀecting the economy, the combination of both observations removes the informational
asymmetry between the central bank and the α-type ﬁrms. In our setup, transparency is
modeled with perfect ﬁrms’ signals on the monetary instrument q and on the central bank
announcement y∗
cb, i.e. with σ2
ϕ = σ2
φ = 0.10
Solving the monetary policy problem under transparency and taking the limit when α
















As ζ1,T indicates, the central bank fully accommodates variations in the eﬃcient level of
output according to the precision of its signal. The strength of central bank’s response
to mark-up shocks ζ2,T increases with the precision of its information σ2
µ, with the price
elasticity of demand ¯ θ, and with the degree of strategic complementarities 1 − ξ. The
response of the central bank under transparency is reminiscent of its response in the case
of perfect sticky-information derived in section 3.2.11
Implementing the optimal monetary policy under transparency yields an unconditional

















































10We consider the case of a credible central bank and abstract from the discussion on whether it would
be optimal for the central bank to cheat the private sector by disclosing a falsiﬁed economic assessment.
11Appendix C presents the optimal monetary policy under transparency for general values of α.
14The loss associated with the output gap is captured by AT, BT, and CT while the
loss associated with the price dispersion is captured by DT. AT stands for the loss under
perfect information as derived in section 3.1. BT is the incremental loss associated with
the output gap that arises when the central bank is unable to perfectly accommodate
the labor supply shock because of its imperfect information. CT captures the mitigation
of the loss associated with output gap that arises with the uncertainty surrounding the
mark-up shock. CT gets smaller with the inaccuracy of ﬁrms’ private information σ2
ρ,
with the inaccuracy of central bank information σ2
µ, and with the degree of strategic
complementarities 1 − ξ. When ﬁrms’ private information and central bank information
is totally noisy, CT perfectly oﬀsets AT, i.e. limσ2
ρ,σ2
µ→∞ CT = −σ2
u/ξ2.
The loss associated with the price dispersion DT increases with the inaccuracy of
central bank information σ2
µ, with the degree of strategic complementarities 1 − ξ, and
with the price elasticity of demand ¯ θ. The precision of ﬁrms’ private information has an
ambiguous eﬀect on the price dispersion: ∂DT
∂σ2







µ. When ﬁrms private
information is highly precise, raising its inaccuracy increases the price dispersion because
ﬁrms tend to assign a large weight to it. By contrast, when the inaccuracy of ﬁrms private
information is suﬃciently high, more inaccuracy reduces the price dispersion because ﬁrms
respond less to their private information.
Overall, the uncertainty surrounding the mark-up shock is welfare improving when







µ , i.e. when CT + DT < 0. The error terms on the mark-up shock are
welfare improving when the loss associated with price dispersion is not too large, that is
when the price elasticity of demand ¯ θ is low.
4.3 Optimal monetary policy under opacity
Under opacity, the informed α-type ﬁrms observe neither the monetary instrument q nor
the central bank assessment of the labor supply shock y∗
cb. They only get their private
signal on the mark-up shock ui. The case of opacity is modeled in our setup with inﬁnite




Solving the monetary policy problem under opacity and taking the limit when α con-




















ζ1,O indicates that the central bank tries to fully accommodate variation in the eﬃcient
level of output according to the precision of its signal. The central bank’s response to
mark-up shocks ζ2,O is always contractionary and becomes stronger with the precision of
its information σ2
µ, with the price elasticity of demand ¯ θ, and with the degree of strategic
complementarities 1−ξ. The eﬀect of the precision of ﬁrms’ private information σ2
ρ is not
monotone on the response to mark-up shocks:
∂ζ2,O
∂σ2







µ . The central bank
implements a strong response to mark-up shocks when the price dispersion is relatively
high, that is to say when the inaccuracy of ﬁrms’ private information is intermediate.
When ﬁrms’ private information is either perfectly accurate (σ2
ρ = 0) or perfectly noisy
(σ2
ρ → ∞) there is no price dispersion and the central bank does not respond to mark-up
shocks.
Implementing the optimal monetary policy under opacity yields an unconditional ex-
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As in the case of transparency, AO stands for the loss under perfect information and
BO for the incremental loss associated with the output gap that arises when the central
bank is unable to perfectly accommodate the labor supply shock because of its imperfect
information. When ﬁrms’ private information and central bank’s information is totally
12Appendix D presents the optimal monetary policy under opacity for general values of α.
16noisy, CO perfectly oﬀsets AO, i.e. limσ2
ρ,σ2
µ→∞ CO = −σ2
u/ξ2. Under opacity, the com-
bined welfare eﬀect of the uncertainty surrounding the mark-up shock on the output gap








Unconditional expected loss under transparency vs. opacity It can be easily
shown that the unconditional expected loss under opacity is always smaller than or equal
to the loss under transparency: CO + DO ≤ CT + DT. In the particular case where









losses are equivalent in both disclosure regimes. This arises when the positive welfare eﬀect
of uncertainty surrounding the mark-up shock on the output gap C perfectly oﬀsets its







µ , the loss associated
with the output gap under opacity is smaller than under transparency (CO < CT) while
the loss associated with price dispersion under opacity is larger than under transparency








4.4 Optimal monetary policy under intermediate transparency
We now turn to the more interesting case of intermediate transparency where the monetary
instrument is perfectly observed by the α-type ﬁrms while the central bank does not make
any explicit announcement about its economic assessment. Intermediate transparency
is modeled in our setup with a perfect signal on the monetary instrument q, but with
an inﬁnitely noisy signal for ﬁrms on the central bank assessment y∗
cb, i.e. σ2
ϕ = 0 and
σ2
φ → ∞.
By implementing its monetary instrument, the central bank implicitly discloses in-
formation to ﬁrms about its economic assessment. However, in the absence of an ad-
ditional announcement, ﬁrms cannot unambiguously decipher the rationale behind the
implemented instrument. For instance, the central bank may implement an expansionary
instrument either because of a positive labor supply shock or because of a negative mark-
17up shock. The central bank ﬁnds it optimal to adjust its response to labor supply and
mark-up shocks in order to shape the information conveyed by its instrument and thereby
the beliefs of ﬁrms with respect to mark-up shocks.
Figure 1 illustrates the optimal conduct of monetary policy as α goes to one for the
three communication strategies considered in this section (transparency, opacity, and in-




ρ = 1, and σ2
η = σ2
µ = 0.2). The ﬁrst graph shows the optimal response of
the central bank to labor supply shocks, the second graph its optimal response to mark-
up shocks, the third graph the loss eﬀect of uncertainty surrounding the mark-up shock
C+D, as deﬁned in sections 4.2 and 4.3, and the fourth graph the loss eﬀect of uncertainty
associated with the output gap C and with price dispersion D separately.
For the extreme cases of transparency and opacity, the optimal responses to labor
supply shocks ζ1,T and ζ1,O are identical. As the central bank can manipulate in neither
of these two extreme cases the beliefs of ﬁrms, it accommodates the labor supply shocks
given the accuracy of its signal. However, under intermediate transparency, the central
bank strongly distorts its response to the labor supply shock in order to optimally shape
ﬁrms’ expectations and to trade oﬀ the output gap against price dispersion.







µ , the uncertainty of ﬁrms with respect to
the mark-up shock has a positive welfare eﬀect associated with the output gap C that is
larger than its negative eﬀect associated with price dispersion D under both transparency
and opacity regimes, i.e. CT + DT < 0 and CO + DO < 0. The same condition holds for
intermediate transparency.
The central bank ﬁnds it optimal to strengthen under intermediate transparency its
response to the labor supply shock when the price elasticity of demand is low in order to
reduce the output gap at the expense of a larger price dispersion. The opposite holds when
the price elasticity of demand is large: since ﬁrms’ uncertainty with respect to the mark-up
shock has a negative welfare eﬀect associated with price dispersion that is larger than its
positive eﬀect associated with the output gap, the central bank weakens its response to
18the labor supply shock for mitigating price dispersion.
The table below shows the unconditional expected loss under transparency E(LT),





µ = 0.2, and for various parameter values of σ2
ρ, ξ, and ¯ θ. The loss under
intermediate transparency is always larger than under opacity but smaller than under
transparency. The advantage of opacity (or of intermediate transparency) is particularly
large when the equivalence condition (11) is strongly violated. The table shows that
opacity is particularly welfare improving for low price elasticity of demand when the degree
of strategic complementarities 1 − ξ and the noise of ﬁrms’ private signal σ2
ρ are large.
The fourth line of the table illustrates the unconditional expected loss under inter-
mediate transparency when the central bank ignores the signaling role of its monetary
instrument and implements – instead of the policy that is optimal under intermediate
transparency – the policy that would be optimal in the case of transparency (ζ1,T and
ζ2,T). The ﬁfth line of the table shows the unconditional expected loss when the central
bank implements the optimal policy under opacity (ζ1,O and ζ2,O) although its monetary
instrument is common knowledge among the α-type ﬁrms. This exercise shows that ig-
noring the signaling role of the policy action can result in large incremental losses when
parameters combination strongly departs from the equivalence condition (11).
σ2
ρ = 0.2 σ2
ρ = 1
ξ = 0.15 ξ = 0.5 ξ = 0.15 ξ = 0.5
¯ θ = 2 ¯ θ = 60 ¯ θ = 2 ¯ θ = 60 ¯ θ = 2 ¯ θ = 60 ¯ θ = 2 ¯ θ = 60
1. E(LT) 38.76 81.19 3.83 11.86 37.56 47.78 3.60 6.34
2. E(LIT) 29.57 79.14 3.62 7.66 10.99 47.70 2.29 5.44
3. E(LO) 27.48 51.76 3.60 4.89 10.52 46.95 2.21 4.75
4. E(LIT) w. T policy 37.42 80.43 3.69 8.93 35.51 47.78 2.88 6.11
5. E(LIT) w. O policy 34.86 79.71 3.63 8.20 19.24 47.75 2.38 5.75
195 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the optimal conduct of monetary policy with imperfect information
on the shocks aﬀecting the economy where ﬁrms’ prices are strategic complements. It
emphasizes that central bank communication intertwines with the design of the optimal
monetary policy pattern: the choice of implementing a monetary instrument and the
communication strategy of the central bank are two sides of the same coin. As discussed
in the extreme cases of transparency and opacity, the optimal monetary policy is a function
of ﬁrms’ beliefs and thereby of the communication strategy of the central bank. Moreover,
the realistic case of intermediate transparency also shows that ﬁrms’ beliefs can be shaped
by monetary policy whenever its interpretation is ambiguous.
The main contribution of this paper is to highlight that the monetary instrument entails
a dual stabilizing role, as a policy response that inﬂuences directly the economy and as
a vehicle for information that shapes ﬁrms’ beliefs. In the case where more information
is welfare detrimental, the central bank faces a dilemma because its monetary instrument
aimed at stabilizing the economy may harmfully shape ﬁrms’ beliefs. Recognizing the
signaling role of its instrument, the central bank ﬁnds it optimal to distort its policy
response in order to mitigate the detrimental information that it may convey.
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A Utility of the representative household
As shown in Adam (2007), maximizing the second order approximation of the welfare of
the representative household in our economy is equivalent to maximizing





(pi − p)2di. (12)
The welfare of the representative household decreases with the output gap and the price
dispersion across ﬁrms. In our informational setup as described in section 2.4 and assuming
the absence of price dispersion previously to the occurrence of the current shocks, the price
dispersion across ﬁrms can be rewritten as
Z 1
0
(pi − p)2di =
Z α
0


















where γ3 is the weight a ﬁrm assigns to its private signal on mark-up shocks in its pricing
rule as deﬁned in (10). Plugging the derivation of the price dispersion according to our
informational setup into the general welfare representation (12) delivers the central bank’s
objective (3) in the text.
22B Linear pricing rule
This appendix solves the rational expectations equilibrium for the pricing rule of the
informed α-type ﬁrms. Following Morris and Shin (2002), we assume that α-type ﬁrms
set their price according to the following linear combination of their signals:
pi = γ1qi + γ2y∗
cb,i + γ3ui.
The optimal weights γ1, γ2, and γ3 depend on ﬁrms’ expectations about the pricing be-
haviour of other ﬁrms. The conditional estimate of the average price is given by
Ei(p) = αγ1Ei(q) + αγ2Ei(y∗
cb) + αγ3Ei(u).
Plugging Ei(p) in the pricing rule (2) and replacing the expectations of ﬁrm i about q, y∗,
y∗
cb, and u as deﬁned in (9) yields
pi = (1 − ξ)Ei(p) + ξEi(q) − ξEi(y∗) + Ei(u)
= (1 − ξ)[αγ1Ei(q) + αγ2Ei(y∗
cb) + αγ3Ei(u)] + ξEi(q) − ξEi(y∗) + Ei(u)
= [α(1 − ξ)(γ1Ω11 + γ2Ω31 + γ3Ω41) + ξΩ11 − ξΩ21 + Ω41 | {z }
γ1
]qi




+[α(1 − ξ)(γ1Ω13 + γ2Ω33 + γ3Ω43) + ξΩ13 − ξΩ23 + Ω43 | {z }
γ3
]ui.
Identifying the coeﬃcients, we get the equilibrium responses of α-type ﬁrms to their signals
(10) in the text.
C Optimal monetary policy under transparency
This appendix presents the optimal monetary policy under transparency as described in
section 4.2 for general values of α, the share of informed ﬁrms. The monetary policy
23problem under transparency consists in minimizing the unconditional expected loss (3)
subject to the equilibrium pricing rule deﬁned in (10) when the monetary instrument q
and the central bank’s assessment y∗
cb are perfectly observed by α-type ﬁrms (σ2
ϕ = σ2
φ = 0).








α(¯ θ − 1)







Taking the limit of ζ1,T and ζ2,T when α goes to one delivers the optimal monetary policy
presented in section 4.2. The equilibrium pricing rule coeﬃcients (10) become under
transparency:
γ1,T =







































D Optimal monetary policy under opacity
This appendix presents the optimal monetary policy under opacity as described in section
4.3 for general values of α, the share of informed ﬁrms. The monetary policy problem
under opacity consists in minimizing the unconditional expected loss (3) subject to the
equilibrium pricing rule deﬁned in (10) when neither the monetary instrument q nor the
central bank’s assessment y∗
cb are observable by α-type ﬁrms (σ2
ϕ,σ2
φ → ∞).
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ρ + (1 − α + αξ)σ2
u)2σ2
µ + (σ2
ρ + (1 − α)σ2
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24Taking the limit of ζ1,O and ζ2,O when α goes to one delivers the optimal monetary policy
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